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RevOps Therapist, founder, and CEO of Greaser Consulting, Jordan Greaser, started in sales and is currently working toward his PhD.
What do academics have to do with generating revenue? More than you’d think.
Breshears thinks about sales differently; he analyzes more and is here to get you to shift the way you think about how to approach the process, from starting up to selling to enterprise clients.
Hi crew, this is Jordan, the owner and CEO of Greaser Consulting. On this episode, we have Mr. David Breshears. He was an early AE at Outreach, one of the most intelligent sales reps that I’ve ever worked with. You know, sales reps kind of get that reputation of they’re going to talk fast or bad at process and they’re just going to go; you meet David Breshears, and wow, he just shatters that stereotype… very methodical, very thoughtful, very process-driven, and just able to think really critically about the why behind everything we do. And so bringing him into this conversation today, I’d love to tell you “that this is the one thing we talked about today, so buckle up.” That didn’t happen. I think we talked about enterprise sales, velocity with the sales reps, early adopters versus late adopters. Anytime you talk with this guy, you’re gonna walk away with, like, six things that you need to go home and just kind of stare at the wall and think about for a while because he’s going to challenge you. So listen, buckle up, tune in, and I know you’re going to enjoy this episode.
Say you want some clarity in sales and marketing and SEP? Well, we have just the remedy: our podcast, RevOps Therapy. Yeah.
Hello, everyone, thanks for joining. I’ve got David Breshears here. Why don’t you go ahead and introduce yourself?
Oh God, I hate this. Hey all. I’m David Breshears. I am, I guess a sales consultant. Everybody asks me what I do, and I don’t really know. I was the… formerly the VP of Professional Services at Sapper, sold at Outreach for a long time, been an enterprise seller for a bunch of years. Funny fact about me: I didn’t have my first sales job until I was 40 years old. Before that, I was a, an academic: graduate student, assistant instructor at the University of Texas in Huston-Tillotson University. And that was kind of funny because that’s where, when Jordan and I first met, that was the immediate thing that we glommed on to is, we both have this weird Graduate Studies background, but a lot of folks in business don’t. And so it was a natural point for us to kind of connect around. So I’m super happy to be here today. Thank you.
Yeah, thanks for coming on. And I still remember talking to you. This was years ago at an Unleash… an Outreach Unleashed conference, and getting your story about being in the PhD, and you didn’t quite finish, and you moved over into sales. And I remember like, I thought, “Man, I am going to go for a PhD, and I’m currently in sales. Am I like doing the exact opposite? Is this right? Is this right?” I don’t, I don’t mean this, like that conversation sowed any doubt; it was “This is a really good conversation. And it’s really interesting to think about the levers that pull people in and out and around, and just how life can go, you know, so many directions you don’t expect.” So I appreciate it. I think that was, like, our first deep conversation on I think, other than sales topic. And on the note of introductions, I know we’re still sort of sitting there. David Breshears here… when he came into Outreach, when I was running on the sales development side of things, he was the person that was really starting to crack the code on how AEs are going to use this platform. And not that this is an Outreach podcast today. But the reason I bring that up is they were having some product market fit issues. BDRs, SDRs made sense; AEs, it was like, “man, we should be able to sell this, but we’re just struggling.” And it was really fascinating to watch a guy who comes in, who comes in from this, like, research, education background, as a seller, that didn’t just facilitate a sales motion, but also helped the team, from a research and development standpoint, figure out how do we get that product market fit? And then how do we need to change? And so I’ve always appreciated… there seems to be this huge push today that, like, education doesn’t matter. And just go into it. But I always appreciated talking to David Breshears, which is a very learned individual that somehow married these worlds really well. So I don’t know if there’s anything you’d like to say about that. But just so you know, that’s always been my impression of you.
Wow, that’s humbling. Yeah, you know, it’s funny. I hear a lot of people denigrating sort of the formal education process, and there’s a lot to hate about higher ed. Shit, that’s why I’m in sales and not higher education, or can I say that? I will sometimes say inappropriate words. But you know, it’s funny we were talking about this earlier: higher education is really interesting because I think a lot of people sort of think of higher education as their undergraduate experience, right? And there’s certainly a lot of value in an undergraduate experience. But if you think about what higher education really does, you kind of advance through different layers; you go from an undergraduate experience, where the goal is really to teach you about sort of the state of whatever you’re studying; if you’re studying mathematics, or you’re studying science, or you’re studying liberal arts, your undergraduate education is designed to teach you about where we are now, give you an understanding of the world of sociology, or the world of psychology, or whatever it is your profession. When you move into master’s work, you start to question some of those foundations of that knowledge base. How do we get here? Why do we know this? How do we know that’s true? Right, you develop a critical lens, and that critical lens is super important. And then as you advance into your doctoral research, your job becomes not just to be able to criticize, but to contribute to add something to the body of knowledge, right? Thousands of years of, you know, intellectual work has gone into this. And now your job is to advance that in some way, shape, or form. And I think it’s unfortunate that we, we sort of look at education as just ending at your undergraduate degree because that work that we do and learning to think categorically and learning to think critically, and then in learning to contribute, to add something to the body of knowledge, that’s new, synthetic, organic, but something that extends, and I think that’s huge. And I really appreciate the compliment, because that’s really what I’ve tried to bring to this role and to this work is the same thing that motivated me to understand problems as graduate students, that training and that framework. And that understanding is what’s helped me, I think, be a more effective seller and to understand things like why doesn’t Outreach resonate more with Account Executives? And those are the fun things to tackle.
It’s just funny, you mentioned how undergrad is you kind of learn the current state, Masters is your beat on it, and PhD: you contribute. And I thought, as I was talking, I thought, “Wow, all of LinkedIn must be at the masters level. Because just about everything on LinkedIn is like, ‘this is wrong’. Okay. But hey, where’s that? Where’s the contribution?” So anyway, we were talking about this, even in the context of how we saw that evolution at Outreach over the years. I don’t want to go too far into this, because I thought you put it really eloquently before we hopped on here today about the move from sales acceleration, and how we were kind of enamored by it. Could you talk a little bit about that? I thought that was fascinating.
Yeah. So part of… one of the, one of the unintended side effects, maybe it’s an unintended side effect of graduate studies, is you tend to think categorically; you tend to break problems down into different buckets. And the buckets that I’ve been using to think about sales, specifically sales development, of late have been around dimensionality, things like velocity and magnitude and depth. And I started by really lamenting the fact that we didn’t go very deep in a lot of our engagements, that in a lot of research, we don’t know how to go very deep, we have a very superficial understanding of a lot of things, right? And, and I thought, “Oh, this is gonna be… I need to have a conversation; I need to think very deeply about how we get deeper and stuff.” But what I realized was depth isn’t where you start; you don’t start by telling people, “Hey, you need to go deeper in your understanding of this problem, or this prospect, or this company, or whatever it is” because depth is a side effect. And it’s a side effect of the other two dimensions. The first one is velocity. When I first got to Outreach, the thing that we were most enamored with, in terms of the platform, was the fact that you could go dump a ton of prospects into a sequence super quick, and then jet off some emails, and boom, you were going, and you had suddenly engaged dozens of people in what would have normally been a bunch of one-off emails. So we got very excited about this. In fact, when the category was being carved out, one of the things we talked about was, was it going to be “sales acceleration”, or was it going to be “sales engagement”? Unfortunately, “sales engagement” won, but I think that instinct to go fast, that idea that sales development is really going to be advanced by technology that can help us go faster, I think that was a mistake. I think at the very… It does help you accelerate. But unfortunately, it often helps you accelerate bad things: putting the wrong people into sequence, having bad data when you put people into sequence, putting the wrong targets and accounts into sequence. Those things all feel like you’re doing something, but they’re are a lot of wasted motion, sacrifice for that sense of velocity moving rapidly. So was that semi what you wanted me to get to? Because that’s, that’s the first part.
I thought that was… I thought that was really good. I’ve always called… you buy a sales engagement platform; it’s the great amplifier. It doesn’t suddenly make you good or bad or whatever. It just takes what’s there, and it just amplifies whatever the thing is. So if you’ve got bad data, and you plug an SEP into it, oh my gosh, you’re gonna know about in a way that you never knew before. Right? If you’re just spraying and praying to begin with, and then you put that notch behind it, you’re gonna spray and pray a little bit more. But if you think a little critically, you’re a little more tailored, it can help you move faster, in an intelligent way, but I think to your point, that was… I remember, even going through the branding; at one point, it was “sales automation” was, was, like, the literal way that it was positioned. And then it was “sales acceleration”. And then we went sideways for a minute because there was this huge vision of, “we’re gonna become a communications platform”. So then we actually for like, I don’t know if you remember this… For like, six weeks, we were an enterprise communication platform. And it was like, “Whoa, like from an SDR perspective, we’re already having trouble getting people on meetings at the early stage, like, I’m telling you, you’re an enterprise communication platform, like, what is this?” And then I don’t know if you know, this, there was the whole category creation and all that investment to become a sales engagement. We wanted that. And now, that’s actually shifted again. Now the big things being said is “sales execution”. So like, wow, I mean, we’re like, listen, we’re years into this thing. And we’re still working through it. So I mean, you talked about layer one; what’s layer two? What’s layer three? Talk to me.
So if the first one is velocity, and it’s that we’re moving too fast on the front end of our engagements, the second one is that we think too big; we have gotten enamored with scale, and everybody wants to do things at scale. And I certainly do; all of the organizations that I work tend to be very large companies that have no choice but to work with lots of teams globally distributed, going up to very large organizations and audiences and, and as a result scale is built into the business. But we, as sellers, I think sometimes get out over our skis unnecessarily; we think in terms of very large units, and one of the places where I see this big, like, most manifest is in the distinction between the way marketing looks at a total addressable market and the way that sales should be looking at an addressable market, right? So from a total addressable market perspective: from marketing, you can have tens of thousands of companies that you could potentially sell to. The trick is, not all of them are in market today. And so marketing’s job is to kind of bring people through the buyer’s journey to create awareness, then drag them through. And if you’ve ever seen the sort of Geoffrey Moore Crossing the Chasm diagram, we know that on the front end of any technology adoption, you’re gonna have a limited audience; it’s going to be your innovators, your early adopters, those technology enthusiasts who are gonna invest in your products before mainstream adoption happens. One of the challenges in thinking in your total addressable market terms is that in marketing terms, they have to talk to that entire spectrum. The… not just the early adopters, but the mainstream market and the laggards as well. For sellers, we need to think in much smaller terms; we can’t think in terms of the mainstream market if we’re selling in that early adoption period, right? If we’re selling at a point where the only folks who are gonna buy it are the folks who don’t need the sort of credibility and track record and experience that mainstream adopters require to buy, then we’re talking about a much smaller subset; Geoffrey Moore says it’s like sixteen and a half percent of your of the entire addressable market should have adopted the technology before you even reach the chasm, which means sales should typically be focused in the tens and the hundreds of accounts that are ready versus marketing, that’s looking at the tens of thousands. And so that notion of slowing down on the front end and thinking smaller is the way that we can start to get deeper in our engagements, because we’re gonna be talking about a much more focused buyer-ready, you know, set of prospects for us to go target.
It’s an interesting tension, though, when you think about early adopters. I mean, you’re absolutely right; you go to target the early adopters because you’re gonna get the revenue faster, right? But the problem with early adopters is the very fact that they’re early adopters. The moment there’s a new tool, or something else looks shiny, or something else that looks interesting, they’re also the first ones to roll off of an organization. And so it’s an interesting tension. Because if you’re talking about “well, we need sales for the sake of sales”. Okay, early adopters is the way to go; let’s put all of our time and effort there as a sales organization. From a retention organization. standpoint, we’ve now put our success folks in a precarious spot because they have a book of business that’s quick to fly somewhere else, too. Yeah. And so, you know, how do you, how do you take what you’re saying, which I’m just to be clear, I’m not disagreeing at all from a strictly sales perspective. But if you zoom out and you say, “Well, yeah, marketing has to look at everything. But what about our partners over in success that you’ve now given them a little bit of a precarious book of business?”
Yeah, and unfortunately, it’s not a choice, right? The, the nice part would be… Yeah, it’d be great if we could pick partners that would be stickier. But the unfortunate part is you can’t sell to the mainstream audience before you’ve reached the chasm. You can’t sell to a mainstream audience before you’ve got the social proof, before you’ve got the demonstrable results, before you’ve got the ROI story that’s ironclad that you could sell to their executive leadership team. And so you just don’t have the option of picking the better customer early on; we’re stuck with the fact that adoption is driven in the early stages, especially if you’re selling a novel technology into a nascent market. If you’re defining a category, like we were at Outreach, you simply don’t have the luxury of waiting for the good customers; you’ve got to go sell to the people who are going to be willing to buy from you in your current state. And I think that’s the most instructive thing that Moore’s Crossing the Chasm does is it really lays out, you don’t have the option of reaching the mainstream market early, even if you want it to; they’ll talk to you, they’ll, they’ll engage you, they’ll even take you through long convoluted buying processes before ultimately saying, “We’re gonna wait until there’s more proof of your success.” So you’re, I think you’re right, that is a hard thing to do; I just don’t think it’s an option. And so as a result, what that means is you’ve got to staff up those support systems; too many companies in the early days think it’s all about just signing people on. What you hit, it was the big challenge: you’ve got to get quick time to value, you’ve got to drive adoption, and you’ve got to drive retention, which means early on in your organization, you’ve got to invest in customer success; they’re going to be critical. And like you said, even more so with these early adopting customers who are going to be enthusiastic, but are gonna have, you know, a short attention span.
Do you ever see the graph that… it shows the I don’t know where this is sourced from, but it shows the revenue stages of a startup and who’s responsible? The first, like, year or two on the graph, new business is all the way at the top, and retention, like, doesn’t exist. And then a couple years down the line, all of a sudden, those two lines cross. And then the reality is any business that actually exists over the long term: new business becomes a really tiny percent. And retention business is the massive part. That being said, I’ve even spoken to investors recently, that they’re looking at, like, Customer Success platforms, for example, and they’re saying, well, there’s no market for that; we need to move up funnel into sales. And I’m thinking “now wait a minute, like, if 80-90, whatever, percent of your revenue is coming from the retention teams, like why wouldn’t their budgets be larger?” Why wouldn’t their budgets… you see what I mean?
And you know why it’s not? Because we don’t… I don’t, I don’t think we have retention leadership in a lot of organizations. I’m just gonna be frank, I think we spend…
I think we just you just got like, six people. The six leaders who do exist just got POed.
And y’all are awesome. Y’all should go evangelize and make other companies hire that shit. When I, you know why I left Outreach, I left Outreach because I demanded to be put into a role of Account Manager. And I did it because I read goddamn Anthony Iannarino’s Eat Their lunch. And one of the things that stuck in my head was the number of companies that get their hooks into a very large enterprise account, get a few seats and say, “Look, we just landed gigantic mega-corporation x.” And then they handed over to a team that’s not primarily involved in selling to sell the remaining 10,000 seats that you should be going to get; we don’t deliberately go expand and earn more share of wallet, because we’re so singularly focused on new client acquisition. And as a result, we spend years, in my case, years landing a hook in a major Fortune Five company, and then we expect those seats to just come in automatically. And instead, it’s another year’s long battle to continue. I continued working for one of those companies as a consultant for another two years after leaving Outreach to make a deal happen. Right? And that was because that’s how long it takes to run retention deals; that length of time doesn’t neatly line up with most revenue organizations’ revenue objectives. And that level of investment from a seller is not something that’s typically calculated into our comp plans and how we think about revenue acquisition. And so we tend to put it on the shoulders of customer success teams who are better suited to managing relationships, making sure customers are being successful, doing a lot of things that don’t involve reaching for the wallet, that don’t involve hunting down new lines of business, that don’t involve making sure that your champions are well supported, to keeping the opponents and competitors at bay. Right? That’s a continuous job; I don’t think many organizations are dedicated to that function. Probably, that’s probably the least popular thing I’m gonna say. And I say some pretty unpopular shit. But…
I’m gonna bring back what you said there to your initial thought about velocity when we’re actually beating on velocity. And the, the sort of premise that we came into this conversation was to get over to depth in SDR. But we were going a little sideways here. But I was gonna say, I think you’re bringing up a point, though, that I really want to touch on. And even though we just beat on velocity in the sense of like, “oh, my gosh, all we thought about was velocity, and we missed steps and all this.” But you still have to have some element of velocity early on, and what you just talked about, okay, every startup company wants to go out and get the whale, because that’s the proof point. “Yeah, we got X, okay. They’re in our book of business now. So everybody will trust us.” But you don’t get strong velocity if you’re out there chasing X early on. Because to your point, you might waste two or three years trying to get a sale that’s actually worth anything from a revenue perspective, when your company’s not ready to handle that; we need reoccurring revenue fast. You see what I mean?
Oh, yeah. And I think you got it, this is an example of velocity isn’t a good or a bad thing. It’s, it’s that it can become something. So I’ll give you the example… where I started this conversation, I’m gonna get back to where you turned because I liked the turn. But where we started this conversation was in my thinking around what reps do at the beginning of their prospecting, right? So typically, when you say, “Hey, we’ve got these sequences; we’ve got this platform; we’re gonna go put people in.” The instinct is just get on and grab a bunch of people out of the CRM and shove them into a sequence and start madly doing activities and thinking that we’ve done something good. We may not have the right accounts; we may not have the right prospects. They probably don’t… they may no longer be at the company. And we don’t have the right contact. There’s a lot of things that are wrong with moving very fast at the beginning of that motion because you’re basically taking your prospecting capacity and making a bunch of random bets instead of slowing down and thinking is this the best use of my time for the next 30 days? Right? So slowing down at that point makes sense, in the same way of what you described that sort of the need for us to be able to simultaneously get new business and demonstrate our credibility early on as a company, but at the same time to invest in those longer-term pursuits of the larger organizations, I think you have to be able to have both of those perspectives. At the same time, you need to have a sales organization that’s able to move quickly with a large subset of customers. But you’ve got to be willing to invest the time and move slowly with those larger businesses and be willing to take it at the pace that they take you. You’re right, if if, if an early-stage company gets one of those gigantic corporations, the chances are that they’re just going to wrap you around the axle. And they are not going to be great if you get them at full scale. But if you, if you try to bite them off, what you wind up finding is it takes a very long time just to get enough trust to have an actual conversation that could lead to some kind of business. And that first business that you get, you’re gonna learn a ton just through going through security reviews, and technical reviews and legal reviews; it’s going to be a long time before you even get to a formal relationship through which they could wrap you around the axle. So invest in that time, go slow, because you’re eventually going to have to learn all those lessons and do all that stuff. The trick is, don’t get impatient; when you get that hook in the mouth, and as you’re going through that process, respect what you’ve gained each step of the way, and then feed off that, invest in, be willing to put the time in because it just takes a lot of time. It takes a very long time to win the trust of what, in all of those cases, we’re talking about these, you know, Fortune 500 companies or Fortune 100 companies; these are your mainstream adopters and laggards. They aren’t going to be the ones who early adopt. And so when you find a visionary within one of those organizations, know that your visionary may be behind you and wanting to move quickly. But you’re dealing with the inertia of a mega-corporation, and so as a result, you’ve got to have a longer tolerance for what the sale is going to look like.
I won’t name names here, but I talked to a really respected sales leader that was talking about being in a startup. They wanted to go upmarket; they hired this really high-octane enterprise sales rep. And a year came and went, and they fired him. Like right out of the gate said, “Listen, you’re not getting us results. See you later.” And the enterprise sales rep comes back and says “Well, I know that you’ve never done enterprise sales before.” And the sales leaders says, you know, it’s a startup company. So different story now. He says, “Oh yeah, I’ve been in you know, all this stuff” and he’s… the guy is telling me the story. And he’s like, the reality was like, “I thought I had done enterprise sales; I hadn’t. And that guy was coming at me. And he was like, ‘here’s, here’s the deal. Like, you’re another year out before any of this closes, like, this is the way this is gonna work. You’re an early startup; he’s like, you can fire me today, that’s fine, but just know, like, we’re actually doing well, but it’s gonna take you a year to know that.’” And the guy, the leader’s like, “I just sent him on his way and thought this guy’s delusional.” And then he said a year, another year came and went, and he’s like, “Oh, my gosh, like, he was probably the best enterprise sales rep we could have hired; he was above pace on everything. We just weren’t ready as an organization. We thought that moves faster, and it doesn’t.” And anyway, I’m just saying this all to say that, in that early stage startup, I mean, getting into the enterprise world, I mean, it’s a dangerous game. It’s a really dangerous game, and expectations are all over the map.
It’s one of the first things, so one of the things I do is consult early-stage startups. And with all of the organizations that I work with, I tend to put big boxes around who we shouldn’t be going after, right? Because there’s, there’s a certain amount of your, your time as an early stage startup, when we’re talking about what… so let’s talk about that the first 15 customers; the first 15 customers that you get have to be lighthouse customers, they… One, they have to be willing to get on a soapbox and say what a great thing you were and publish their results and go on stage with you at conferences and be that charismatic, referenceable customer that’s gonna get your next figure. The second is, you have to have enough customers to test some major segments. You can’t just go willy-nilly after 15 companies that have no commonalities between them, and then say, “there you go, we can sell this crap” because you can’t; you’ve got 15 random collections of companies that have bought it with no common denominators. Is it by industry and Market Segment? Geography, right? There’s got to be something that unites them. And they’re probably different ways that you could go after an SMB versus mid-market versus commercial. And so you need to look for a spread of customers that have some of those commonalities so that you can start seeing “where are we strongest”? You know, I would argue that some companies that sell very technical products may find that when they go down market to an SMB audience early on, that those folks are kind of screwed because they need a ton of help and hand-holding, and you don’t have an apparatus to hold that many hands; you’d be much better off going after a more sophisticated mid-market or commercial customer, fewer of them, larger paychecks so that you can invest that attention. So I think picking your target size, both high and low is important. But staying out of the enterprise space early is just a strong idea. Even when I was at Outreach, shit, I was there at like June of 2… 2017. And there was really just the beginning of a lot of work. It did happen a little bit before that. But we’re really just starting to get into the development of an enterprise team. That was like two years into the platform, two years into going to market; we were already above 10 million in revenue. Right? So when we talk about early, I think we got to put it in context, there’s early like, “I’m gonna get my first 10 customers”. And then there’s early like when I was an Outreach where we were going from 10 to 25. And that’s a so so I think when you get to the 10 to 25, you are at the point where you got to start tackling those big enterprise beasts; sub-10 million, be careful.
Oh, that one, one deal makes or breaks the business. And on top of that, even if it quote unquote, makes the business, the amount of infrastructure required for the success side of the house that you were talking about, to keep that client or to fill the need. That’s even… man, we’re going real sideways on this one. But I remember whenever we first rolled out pro-serve packages, and everybody had their pants on fire, because they’re like, wait a minute, now we got to pay, like we would expect clients to pay for this? And it’s like, well look on the enterprise side, they want to pay a pro-serve consultant. That way, they can say, “Hey, listen, we paid pro-serve; if it didn’t work, it’s not my fault. I paid the pro-serve guy,” right? And we had all the infrastructure; we had all the help and all the whatever. I mean, listen, if you’re an early-stage startup, I mean, my goodness, you got to get sales, like you’re talking about; retention is a thing. And now we’re talking about you need an entire pro-serve motion. Like oh my gosh, there’s a whole lot all at once. And if you don’t have a pro-serve motion, and you’re not asking them to like, what do I want to say, to buy pro-serve hours, guess what? Your customer success… They’re just going to be giving it away for free anyway. Yeah. So they’re sucking up a major amount of resource and you’re just anyway…
You deprive that oxygen from everyone else, right? It’s not just that you have to build that resources, but enterprise clients are demanding. And there’s another place that I think they screw you too. And that is you have to have an extreme amount of product discipline when you take on those customers because they will have a lot of demands for custom configurations and custom feature development. And, you know, there’s.. is there any way that I can get you to connect to NetSuite, right? Like no, we’re not. No, that’s not a thing. Right?
Plug into my ERP that was made in-house.
It’s a Seybold system; it’s pretty awesome. You know, there’s a lot to love about an enterprise customer when it comes to, like, paycheck time, but man, I never got rich hunting whales, but god damn do I love me a whale. They just, they’re, they’re fun and challenging. And they are a test of the maturity of an organization. And they will point out your gaps and weaknesses. And if you arise to them, you will be a much better organization as a result, but I don’t think you chase them to get rich. I think you test that… you chase them to test sort of your organization’s capacity to manage scale, right? Like it’s a good thing to have these tests. It’s a pressure test. It’s going to test all of your systems; it’s going to test your capacity in every way. But I don’t think you do it because those are going to be the things that get you to an IPO. It’s at least not from a revenue perspective. From a systems perspective? Yes.
Well, Mr. Breshears, I’m looking at the clock here. We’re at time. I think we could just turn the clock on and hit record. And if nobody listens, I don’t think we’d care. Yeah, that’s what, that’s what I’m saying. I appreciate you coming on today. We’ll have to have you back. And we’ll keep going. We’ll choose a topic again and not talk about it.
Yeah, exactly. I think this could be our theme. Right? We’ll just get together, pick something, and then talk about anything except that for half an hour and see what happens. Jordan, thank you, dude. Really appreciate you having me on man.
All right. Stay out of trouble. See ya.
I’ll do my best. Thanks, sir.
Hot dog. That was a great episode. Thanks for listening. If you want to learn more about Greaser Consulting or any information you heard on today’s episode, visit us online at www.greaserconsulting.com. Be sure to click the Follow button and the bell icon to be notified on the latest here at RevOps Therapy. Thanks and see you real soon.